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1. Introduction
International negotiations are an essential part of the
European Union’s (EU) external affairs. Only in the past
decade, the EU concluded over 140 agreements1 on di-
verse and highly salient issues including security, trade
and climate change.2 Article 218 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) sets out a “sin-
gle procedure of general application”3 for the negotiation
of international agreements and provides the different
roles in the negotiating process for the Commission, the
Council and the European Parliament (hereinafter: EP).
A key aspect of negotiations is access to and shar-
ing of information among the EU institutions involved as
well as to the general public. Oversight of negotiations
requires insight into the topics of negotiation, the posi-
tions taken and the strategies employed. Concurrently,
however, some space for confidentiality is necessary to
conduct the negotiations and defend EU interests with-
out fully revealing the limit negotiating positions of the
EU to the negotiating partner. Attaining a balance be-
tween the necessities of oversight and confidentiality in
negotiations is therefore the subject of a dynamic debate
among EU institutions.
Scholars have extensively discussed the role of the
EP in the context of EU international agreements (Ripoll
Servent, 2014; Van den Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2015),
including issues of the “democratisation” of external
1 Research through the Eurlex database using Art. 218 TFEU as a legal basis, excluding protocols.
2 For example, the Paris Agreement on Climate (2015), the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada (2016), or readmission agree-
ments for persons residing without admission for example with Cape Verde (2013).
3 Case C-658/11 European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, para. 68.
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affairs (Meissner, 2016), and how its role in external
relations impacts the EU’s constitutional fabric (Card-
well, 2011; Eckes, 2014; Krauss, 2000). These studies
in principle point to the executive and semi-executive
institutions, the Commission and Council respectively,
as actors with a preference for space for confidential-
ity rather than openness of negotiations. By contrast,
the EP, for carrying out its oversight function, often fea-
tures as the protagonist pushing for greater transparency
(Curtin, 2013).
The Court of Justice of the European Union (here-
inafter: CJEU) and the European Ombudsman (here-
inafter: EO) also play crucial institutional roles in main-
taining a balance between this space for confidential-
ity and requirements of transparency. For example, the
CJEU safeguards the EP’s right to information through the
interpretation of Art 218(10) (Abazi, 2016; Peers, 2014)
and limits the space for confidentiality due to the exer-
cise of the right to public access to information (Abazi
& Hillebrandt, 2015). The EO, in turn, tries to mediate
in cases of administrative malpractice that include ques-
tions of access to information (see also Neuhold & Năs-
tase, 2017, in this issue).4
Yet what we lack is a more integrated analysis of
whether and how parliamentary, judicial and administra-
tive oversight together constrain EU executive secrecy
in international negotiations.5 This paper aims to fill
this lacuna. Seemingly allies in transparency, we ques-
tion whether parliamentary, judicial and administrative
branches of oversight share similar views of transparency
in international negotiations. Are these institutions al-
lies in pursuing the objectives of transparency and/or
when do their positions diverge? The notion of an al-
liance is used in this paper to imply an alignment of pref-
erences and not a concerted joint action by indepen-
dent institutions.
The paper analyses cases on public and institutional
access to documents in the EU’s international negotia-
tions. Based on these cases, it derives institutional pref-
erences on the support of access to documents and the
degree of openness in publishing documents. The latter
dimension is conceptualised as a scale, ranging from a
situation where an institution provides public access to
documents on the assumption that all documents should
be made public, unless there is an overriding justifiable
reason for some level of secrecy. The other end of the
scale pertains to the institution arguing in favour of con-
fidentiality of documents unless there is a convincing ar-
gument for public disclosure. The paper shows that most
institutional preferences on the degree of openness fall
between these extremes.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
the overall research design through which we derive the
institutional preferences on transparency. Based on the
consulted sources, Section 3 discusses the role of judi-
cial, parliamentary and administrative oversight in fur-
thering transparency in international negotiations. Sec-
tion 4 builds upon this analysis in order to map the align-
ments among the institutions along their preferences.
We offer conclusions in Section 5 by reflecting on the im-
plications of our findings.
2. EU Institutional Preferences on (Limits to)
Transparency in Foreign Policy
Transparency is a much-debated issue both in academic
and public discourse. It is often treated as conceptually
close to the notions of accountability and legitimacy, but
we still lack a consensus on its specific meaning. Yet
one aspect of transparency is straightforward: it is a pre-
condition for conducting oversight, whether public or
institutional. Without some transparency, how can one
see what ought to be kept in check? (Bentham, 1839).
This paper aims to contribute to the expanding discus-
sion on the “accountability landscape” by examining the
preferences of the institutions on the conditionality of
oversight. Oversight is understood as a loose relation
of checks, as opposed to an accountability arrangement
that addresses a relation of principal and agent with ele-
ments of sanctions in the hands of the principal (Bovens,
2010; Brandsma & Adriaensen, 2017).
The specific contribution of this paper is to provide
insights on the space where contestations on the neces-
sary levels of transparency and secrecy between institu-
tions are discussed. To this end, we study the positions of
different EU (oversight) institutions on the limits of trans-
parency in foreign policy. The purpose is not only to iden-
tify the institutions’ positions but also to gauge whether
these positions are shared or whether divergences can
be observed. Preferences on secrecy and transparency
are not derived in isolation but are continuously shaped
and reshaped through inter-institutional interplays. Con-
sequently, it is impossible to separate institutional pref-
erences from the broader context in which these institu-
tions operate. Indeed, the new-institutionalist literature
has long acknowledged this conceptual struggle when
searching to assess the “true preferences” of a political
agent (Immergut, 1998). Hence, we first discuss the con-
textualisation of institutional preferences and then ex-
plain themethodology throughwhichwe seek to identify
these preferences.
2.1. Contextualising Institutional Preferences
The EU oversight institutions studied in this article each
play a significantly different role through their core func-
tions. Their differences give rise to questions of whether
one could expect them to have similar positions on trans-
4 Art. 3 and 4a (OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, p. 15) and amended by its decisions of 14March 2002 (OJ L 92, 9.4.2002, p. 13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ L 189, 17.7.2008,
p. 25).
5 Parliamentary oversight in this article is interpreted as covering only the EP. At best the Council can be regarded as a hybrid actor, carrying both traits of
an executive and a legislative (Adriaensen, 2017). However, member states are often directly involved in the negotiations, granting them direct access
to all available information (Delreux & Van den Brande, 2013).
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parency. In this paper, a position or preference for trans-
parency implies that the institutions would support dis-
closure of the document. An institution may favour the
disclosure of all documents requested,may favour disclo-
sure of certain parts of a document (otherwise known as
partial disclosure), or may argue in favour of secrecy.
Taking an inductive approach, we want to identify
and map (potential) similarities and differences not
through a predetermined theoretical framework but on
the basis of what the institutions themselves have stated
in cases involving public and institutional access to infor-
mation. On the one hand, one may expect that a court
could be in favour of disclosure of documents in light
of defending principles of transparency and good gover-
nance, which the courts are tasked to safeguard. On the
other hand, executive institutionswould have an interest
inmaintaining some secrecy in the foreign policy arena in
which they function and hencemay have a preference for
space of confidentiality. These differences in positions
would not be fully unexpected in light of existing litera-
ture that focuses on transparency in foreign policy (Abazi
& Hillebrandt, 2015), and on the broader constitutional
role of the institutions studied here. However, whether
this is indeed the case in EU institutional practice is amat-
ter that this paper will explore.
We do not seek to conceptualise institutional prefer-
ences as a simplistic divide between institutions favour-
ing transparency and others that do not. Instead, our
efforts are focused on the broad range of arguments
provided by the institutions with the goal of improv-
ing our understanding of why institutions take their re-
spective positions. The common thread among the over-
sight institutions we examine is that they deal with trans-
parency but have a different institutional role towards
transparency. The mandate of the EO pertains to mal-
administration and issues of public access to informa-
tion. As its mandate is limited in terms of substance and
scope (the institutions it can scrutinise), the EO has a
track record of informally pushing the envelope of its
reach. On the EO’s interpretation of Regulation 1049/01,
it has been noted that a “broad definition of ‘document’
has been adopted, matched by a narrow one as to the
exemptions, thereby giving substance to the right of ac-
cess” (Vogiatzis, 2018, p. 153). The Court has a role in
ensuring that EU law is observed. It conducts judicial re-
view, making sure that the EU institutions act in confor-
mity with EU law. Hence, the role of the Court is to up-
hold the principle of transparency and ensure that if an
exception is applied that takes place in accordance with
the established limits between transparency and secrecy.
The role of the EP as co-legislator is also complex. It has
political significance for determining transparency levels
not only through its ownpractice but also through its role
as legislator.
2.2. Deriving Institutional Preferences
The objective of this paper is to understand the oversight
institutions’ preferences on transparency in the EU’s in-
ternational negotiations. To that end, we study the argu-
ments they present in cases on public and parliamentary
access to information, i.e. cases pertaining to Regulation
1049/01 and Article 218(10) TFEU respectively. The fo-
cus on public and parliamentary access to information
as opposed to other definitions and conceptualisations
of transparency (see e.g. De Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaias-
son, & Gilljam, 2014; Pozen, 2010), follows from the le-
gal regimes on which our data-gathering is based. Public
access to documents enables public awareness and de-
bate of the EU’s negotiations, which are necessary for
public trust in the negotiations and their potential suc-
cessful outcome (Abazi, 2016). Institutional access by the
EP is necessary for democratic oversight of EU negoti-
ations (Curtin, 2014). Whilst we do not subsume these
two types of access to documents under the same ratio-
nale since they serve different purposes, one of public ac-
countability and the other of democratic oversight, both
these types of access are a necessary condition for any ac-
countability or oversight process to occur. Therefore, we
find them both relevant when addressing transparency
in the EU’s international negotiations.
Regulation 1049/01 stipulates the regime for public
access to documents.6 Article 4(1)(a) therein provides
the exceptions to public access to documentswith regard
to international relations. This exception is considered of
mandatory nature since the institution is obliged to first
explain that the disclosure of the requested document
could specifically and actually undermine the protected
interest and, second, that the risk deriving from the dis-
closure is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypo-
thetical.7 If these two conditions are met, the institution
is not obliged to examine whether there is an overriding
public interest in disclosure, which is the case with the
exceptions under Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/01.
In the EU’s international negotiations, the appointed
negotiator is obliged to inform the EP “immediately and
fully…at all stages of the procedure”.8 Art. 218(4) TFEU
stipulates the role of the Council during the negotiations
and provides that—in addition to the possibility of adopt-
ing negotiating directives—the Council may “designate a
special committee in consultation with which the nego-
tiations must be conducted”.9 The difference in wording
as to the obligations of the negotiator toward the Council
and the EP is already indicative of the different treatment
6 Regulation 1049/01 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to EP, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001,
L 145/43.
7 Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Sophie in ‘t Veld, EU:C:2014:2039, para. 64.
8 See Art 218(10) TFEU. In what follows, we will treat the Commission as the sole negotiator and make abstraction from instances where negotiating
authority is delegated to the HR/EEAS or an ad hoc negotiating team (often comprising the Commission).
9 For trade negotiations, this committee is determined by Art 207(3). It shall “assist” the Commission in the negotiations and the Commission—as
negotiator—is due to report regularly to this committee as well as the EP.
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of these institutions with regard to institutional access
to information.
Preferences with respect to institutional and public
access to documents are drawn from existing case law.
To complement these measures, we derived a third in-
dicator, which is more political in nature and tries to
gauge the institutions’ preference on the degree of trans-
parency in international negotiations in more general
terms (beyond the contested cases). Does an institution
adhere to the idea that all international negotiating doc-
uments should in principle be accessible unless convinc-
ing evidence can be presented to suggest otherwise? Or
should the exception of international negotiations apply
to all documents related to international negotiations un-
less a compelling case can be made that their release
to the legislative institutions or the public would not
harm the negotiations? The proactive publication of doc-
uments (in the absence of an external demand for it)
reflects an administrative practice informed by the ac-
knowledgment that the logic of secrecy may not apply
to certain documents. The preference on the degree of
openness goes beyond such an administrative practice
and appeals to the underlying rationale. This rationale
is—in part—reflected in the preferences on institutional
and public access as derived from case law but aims to
transcend these cases by looking at the line of reasoning
presented within and beyond the selected cases.
The oversight institutions’ preferences cannot be
studied independently from their mandated roles in the
EU’s constitutional fabric, aswasmentioned above. Inter-
views as amethodof data-gatheringwere hence deemed
inadequate to gauge the position of a singular institu-
tion. As a representative, the EP covers a great plural-
ity of voices and its role as a (co-)legislator implies its
preferences cannot be fully understood without refer-
ence to the Council. Hence, it would be challenging to de-
rive representative claims for the whole institution draw-
ing on a series of personal interviews. The EO’s involve-
ment in matters of transparency is bound by the legisla-
tive act through which it has been created, and the EO’s
position in its transparency decisions is linked to case
law (Neuhold & Năstase, 2017, in this issue). The Court
is guided by the principles of impartiality and indepen-
dence, yet at times is also seen as “activist”, whichmay to
some extent have effects on its jurisprudence. Taking this
into account, it is unlikely that the CJEU or the OE would
divulge a clear preference beyond stating the legislation
they are to uphold. As our objective is to provide a com-
parative mapping of preferences across the oversight in-
stitutions, we therefore focus on revealed preferences in
cases on institutional and public access to documents.
This paper offers an analysis which applies to inter-
national agreements across EU policy fields, i.e. interna-
tional agreements regarding trade or related to CFSP, tak-
ing into account that accessibility to information is a pro-
cedural requirement applicable to all international agree-
ments under Art 218 TFEU and of mandatory nature.10
The focus on international negotiations implies that the
paper does not examine the lack of transparency in EU’s
legislative process, specifically the trilogue negotiations
(see Leino, 2017, in this issue). More clearly than in other
primary law reforms, the Lisbon Treaty draws a distinc-
tion between external diplomacy and internal legislation
and the latter is conditioned by requirements of lawmak-
ing that uphold a higher level of transparency and should
not be treated as a diplomatic setting of negotiations.11
By focusing on contested access to document re-
quests, one could argue that the agreements covered in
our analysis are self-selected and therefore do not consti-
tute a representative sample. Yet, we consider this less
problematic for two reasons. First, the preferences ex-
pressed in such contested cases either reaffirm or tilt the
institutions’ view on the balance between transparency
and secrecy towards the former. They shape expecta-
tions in other (future) negotiations. Second, the cases
we study cover a broad range of the EU’s external ne-
gotiations. We incorporate cases on trade (ACTA, TTIP),
transatlantic security cooperation (TFTP) and CFSP (Tan-
zania, Mauritius). Therefore, the focus on international
agreements in which transparency is a contested issue
does not lead to a selection bias.
3. Public and Institutional Access in the EU’s
International Negotiations
In the EU’s international negotiations, it is particularly
useful to distinguish between the negotiating mandate
on the basis of which the negotiations take place and
other documents which emerge during the process of
negotiations. We focus on these sets of documents sep-
arately since different principles govern access to each.
3.1. Negotiating Mandate
International negotiations are initiated on the basis of
a mandate drafted by the Commission and adopted by
the Council.Whilst informal contacts take place between
the Commission and the negotiating partner prior to the
Commission’s drafting of a mandate (Gastinger, 2015;
Stein, 1988), this section focuses on the adoption of the
negotiatingmandate as the initiation of the negotiations.
We elaborate whether and to what extent the mandate
is disclosed through public and institutional access.
The mandate of negotiations is deemed to have a
constitutional significance.12 The Court maintains a dis-
tinction between the specific content of the mandate re-
lating to the substance of negotiations and the choice
of legal basis regarding those negotiations.13 The latter
10 Case C-658/11 European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025, paras. 52, 72.
11 See Case C-280/11 P, Council v. Access Info Europe, EU:C:2013:671, para. 63.
12 Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Sophie in ‘t Veld, EU:C:2014:2039.
13 Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Sophie in ‘t Veld, EU:C:2014:2039.
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does not form part of the substance of the negotiations
and as such may be considered separately. Furthermore,
the institutions do not have discretion to withhold the
mandate merely because it pertains to international ne-
gotiations, but rather an assessment must be conducted
in line with the exceptions under Article 4(1)(a) of Regu-
lation 1049/01.
Regarding public access, recent case law has clarified
the level of proof that the institutions must establish
in order to defend secrecy in international negotiations
(Abazi & Hillebrandt, 2015). Namely, the institutionmust
first establish that the disclosure of the requested docu-
ment could specifically and actually undermine the pro-
tected interest and second, that the risk deriving from
the disclosure is reasonably foreseeable and not purely
hypothetical. This test has long been part of judicial re-
view regarding the exceptions in Regulation 1049/01. Yet,
since the case of Council v. Sophie In’t Veld it is clearly ap-
plicable in the context of international relations.
The originator of the information has the authority
to decide whether the document will be disclosed fol-
lowing the exceptions stipulated in Regulation 1049/01.
With regard to themandate, the fact that it is the Council
that gives themandate to the Commission for the negoti-
ations is sometimes lost in the public debates. In the case
of TTIP, the Commission received criticism that it lacked
transparency and refused to share this document pub-
licly.14 However, it falls under the authority of the Coun-
cil, which issues the mandate, to publicly release it. In
the case of TTIP, however, the mandate was leaked. On
the one hand, the EO targeted the Council with an own
inquiry to demand the release of the negotiating man-
date for TTIP.15 The EO argued that the leaked document
shows that there are no clear reasons why a publication
would jeopardise the public interest. The EO argued that
the release would not invalidate the applicability of Arti-
cle 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 to negotiating mandates
at large.16 It would instead add credence to the view that
the Council is concerned with transparency and seeks to
strike a balance between efficiency and transparency. On
the other hand, the Council in its opinion accentuated
that it is not obliged to reveal themandate as it concerns
a non-legislative document and thus there is no instance
of maladministration.17 Throughout the exchange of let-
ters both the Council and the EO were conscious of the
risk of setting a precedent for future agreements.18
Under growing public pressure, the Commission has
advocated the public release of the mandates by the
Council. Former commissioner Karel DeGucht pushed for
the release of the TTIP negotiating mandate on multiple
occasions, among others in a plenary debate in the EP.19
As part of the new trade strategy’s emphasis on trans-
parency, Commissioner Malmström indicated she would
“[invite] the Council to publish all negotiating mandates
immediately”.20
Ultimately the Council released the mandate. How-
ever, more general conclusions cannot be drawn that
the Council would continue to make the mandate pub-
lic for other international agreements. Since the publi-
cation of the TTIP negotiating mandate, the Council has
been more cooperative in releasing similar documents
in highly politicised negotiations. Still, in most cases the
publication took place long after the launch of the ne-
gotiations (cf. TTIP, CETA and TiSA) or through a partial
release omitting critical sections of the document (e.g.
EU–China investment agreement). The Commission also
requested the release of the mandates for the free trade
negotiations with Japan, Mexico and Tunisia in Septem-
ber 2016.21 Commissioner Malmström reiterated her
request in May 2017 a few weeks before Greenpeace
leaked documents related to the EU Japan free trade
negotiations.22 The Council discussed the issue during
a meeting of the Trade Policy Committee but could not
obtain the common accord required for their public re-
lease. In sum, the Council has thus far only shown a will-
ingness to publicly release negotiating mandates at an
advanced stage in the negotiations, amidst intense pres-
sure from civil society and the European institutions, and
when the lack of transparency may jeopardise the nego-
tiations. Hence, while they provide some tentative sup-
port for the public access to the mandate (scored low→
medium), their preference regarding the degree of open-
ness remains low as summarized in Table 1.
With regard to the position of the EP on public access
to information, a stream of cases reveal that the EP has
not intervened in support of the party requesting public
14 On 19 May 2014, Friends of the Earth Europe sent a coordinated message on behalf of 250 civil society organisations to DG Trade to “open the ne-
gotiation process to the public, by releasing the negotiating mandate, documents submitted by the EU, and negotiating texts” (Friends of the Earth
Europe, 2014, emphasis added). This demand was also the subject of an access to documents request which ultimately gave rise to a complaint with
the European Ombudsman (EO Case: 119/2015/PHP).
15 EO Case OI 11 2014 RA.
16 EO Case OI 11 2014 RA Letter to the Council of the EU requesting an opinion in the European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry OI/11/2014/MMN
concerning transparency and public participation in relation to the TTIP negotiations.
17 Response from the Council Annex paragraph 5 arrived at EO on 4 October 2014.
18 Communication of the EO to the Presidency of the Council on 30 September 2014.
19 Plenary Debate of the EP in Strasbourg on 15 July 2014, 2014/2714(RSP).
20 Cecilia Malmström, The Future of EU Trade Policy. Speech on 24 January 2017 at Bruegel institute. Retrieved from http://bruegel.org/2017/01/the-
future-of-eu-trade-policy
21 Cecilia Malmström (2016), “Cssr Malmström letter to SK Minister Peter Žiga on Transparency”. Correspondence by the Commissioner, 6 Septem-
ber 2016 Ares(2016)5072313. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/carol/index-iframe.cfm?fuseaction=download&documentId=090166e5ac9ceb5d
&title=CM%20Letter%20Mi%20nister%20%C5%B%20Diga.pdf
22 Cecilia Malmström (2017), “Subject: Publication of EU–Japan FTA Negotiating Directives”. Correspondence by the Commissioner, 24 May 2017
Ares(2017)2639445. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/carol/index-iframe.cfm?fuseaction=download&documentId=090166e5b28a816d&title=CM
_signed%20Publication%20JPN%20mandate.pdf
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Table 1.Mapping institutional preferences on transparency of the negotiating mandate.
Support for Institutional Support for Public Preference for Degree of
Access Access Openness
European Parliament High — —
European Ombudsman High High Medium
CJEU Medium Medium —
Council Low Low-Medium Low
European Commission High Medium/High Medium
access to information in issues regarding international re-
lations.23 Hence, we do not have data from case law on
what precisely the position of the EP would be with re-
gard to the mandate; yet, it can be added that the EP
does not get actively involved in furthering public access
to information and does not draw sufficient attention to
this issue in its Resolutions. The latter instrument is a par-
ticularly significant tool for the EP to influence the mar-
gins of disclosure for the mandate, although resolutions
are not legally binding to the Council.
While the EP is not directly involved in the drafting
and adoption of the mandate, in line with Art 218(10)
TFEU it is supposed to be informed at all stages of the
procedure. Hence, it should receive the mandate of ne-
gotiations. The Lisbon Treaty provided increased prerog-
atives to the EP in international negotiations by grant-
ing veto powers. Practice suggests that the EP uses its
increased powers for access to information in order to
affirm its institutional role. For example, on the Terror-
ist Finance Tracking Programme Agreement with the US,
the EP first vetoed the Agreement by raising concerns
on data protection safeguards to only then give its con-
sent at a later stage although there were “no remarkable
differences between the first and second agreements”
(Vara, 2013, p. 20). Rather, the difference was that in
the second round of negotiations, the EP was fully in-
formed at all stages of the negotiations. This has raised
questions of whether the EP’s position is too focused on
inter-institutional power dynamics (Eckes, 2014). A sim-
ilar change of position after having received more in-
formation is also notable with regard to the Passenger
Name Record Agreement with the US (Ripoll Servent &
McKenzie, 2011).
In sum, the Court and the EO favour public access
to the mandate. Disclosure does not necessarily apply
to the entire document. The Court draws a distinction
between the legal basis, which should be disclosed, and
other substantive parts of the mandate that may remain
confidential. The Court does not accept an argument in
favour of secrecy by default for the mandate simply be-
cause this document pertains to international relations.
Rather, the Council and the Commission must substanti-
ate their reasoning for non-disclosure in light of require-
ments established by the Court. While the EP is gener-
ally supportive of access to information, for themandate
specifically we lack sufficient data to draw solid conclu-
sions as to whether this support is high. Yet, when it
comes to institutional access, the EP hasmade significant
efforts to ensure that its prerogative to access informa-
tion is respected and has also utilised judicial recourse
towards such aims.
The Court is also in favour of an informed EP through-
out all stages of international negotiations, as is evident
from a few recent salient cases regarding institutional ac-
cess in line with Art 218(10). Taking into account that the
EO is generally aligned with the case law of the CJEU as
far as transparency is concerned (Abazi & Tauschinsky,
2015), it could be noted that the EO favours institutional
access to the mandate. The position of the Commission
is less clear. Although in the case of TTIP the Commission
argued in favour of opening up themandate by the Coun-
cil, whether this continues as the new practice and posi-
tion of the Commission remains to be seen. The recent
reminder to publish the mandates for the negotiations
with Japan, Mexico and Tunisia supports this view. Still,
the litmus proof consists of continuing this practice once
politicisation subsides.
3.2. Negotiating Process
Public access to information is limited during the nego-
tiating process. The Council and the Commission contin-
uously defend secrecy as necessary for the negotiating
process, emphasising the need for trust between the ne-
gotiating partners (Abazi & Hillebrandt, 2015). Interest-
ingly, the EP posits similar arguments in favour of nondis-
closure when citizens file public access requests. For ex-
ample, the EP refused access to documents regarding the
ACTA arguing in favour of secrecy not only for ongoing ne-
gotiations but also for future negotiations, stating that:
There is a concrete risk that disclosure of preparatory
documents would prejudice not only relations with
third countries in the context of ACTA, but also any
other negotiation to be conducted by the EU in the
future. Indeed, any future negotiating partner of the
23 See: Council v. Hautala (appeal) (2001), Kuijer II (2002), Case T 264/04,WWF-EPP v. Council (2007), Sison II (33-39) (2007), Sweden/IFAW (2007), Case
T 42/05, Williams v. Commission (2008), Case T59/09 Germany v. Commission (2012), Case T-301/10 In ‘t Veld v. Commission (2013), Case T 93/11,
Stichting CEO (2013), Besselink (2013), Jurasinovic appeal case (2013), Joined Cases C 514/11 P and C 605/11 P, LPN case (2013).
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EU could doubt the EU’s reliability with regards to the
confidentiality of negotiations, if preparatory docu-
ments concerning the position of one of the EU’s con-
tracting partners were released to the public.24
The EO, although generally critical of the lack of trans-
parency, shares the view that some level of secrecy
is justified in international negotiations. The EO reaf-
firmed this position when handling an access to docu-
ments request vis-à-vis the EP in the context of the ACTA
negotiations.25 Similarly, regarding the Council, the EO
stated that:
Releasing the documents in question, [would] reveal
the negotiating position of the US and Japan, [and]
would be highly likely to be detrimental to the EU’s re-
lations with those countries. The EO also agrees that,
as further argued by the Council, it is likely that such
disclosurewould have a negative effect on the climate
of confidence in the on-going negotiations, and that it
would hamper open and constructive co-operation.26
Nevertheless, the EO seems to pursue a balance be-
tween the opposing needs of transparency and secrecy
in international negotiations. The EO opened an own-
initiative inquiry levied against the Commission for ac-
cess to document requests in relation to TTIP and the
existence of a potential bias in the Commission’s disclo-
sure of negotiating documents to a limited group of “priv-
ileged stakeholders”.27 The EO provided five recommen-
dations to increase transparency, including not only the
hosting of all disclosed documents on their website, the
creation of a public register and the publication of all
meetings with civil society, but also the reinforcement
of measures to ensure confidential documents stay con-
fidential. Inmuch of its communication, the EO alsomen-
tioned TTIP as a specific case andwas cautious in drawing
wide-ranging conclusions on other cases.
The Commission has taken a more proactive ap-
proach towards publishing negotiating positions, not
only with respect to TTIP but also other ongoing negotia-
tions (Coremans, 2017, in this issue). Yet whether these
efforts will be maintained once politicisation subsides
can be questioned (Gheyle & De Ville, 2017, in this issue).
Regarding institutional access, practice shows that
the Council delays significantly in meeting its obligation
to inform the EP. For example, in the case of European
Parliament v. Council,28 the Council shared the docu-
ment for the EU–Mauritius Agreement more than three
months after the adoption of that decision and the sign-
ing of that agreement.29 In this case the CJEU held that
the information requirement laid down in Article 218(10)
TFEU applies to the entire process of international ne-
gotiations and significantly, that this procedural require-
ment also applies to agreements falling exclusively under
CFSP.30 Therefore, informing the EP is a mandatory pro-
cedural requirement within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and its infringement leads
to the nullity of the measure.31 Similarly, in the case of
the EU–Tanzania agreement, the Court held that even a
delay of 9 days implies that the EP was not informed “im-
mediately” and hence the Council had failed to comply
with its obligations to share information in all stages of
the procedure fully and immediately.32
The different positions are summarised in Table 2 be-
low. The data confirms the differences in positions on
institutional access to documents between the Council
and Commission, as (quasi-)executive bodies on the one
hand, and the institutions responsible for legislative, ju-
dicial and administrative oversight, on the other hand.
When we take a closer look at support for public access
and the institution’s preference on the degree of open-
Table 2.Mapping institutional preferences on transparency during negotiations.
Support for Institutional Support for Public Preference for Degree of
Access Access Openness
European Parliament High Medium (→ Low) Medium
European Ombudsman High High Medium→ High
EUCJ High Medium (→ High) Low
Council Low Low Low
European Commission Low (→Medium) Low (→Medium) Low (→Medium)
24 See EO case 90/2009/(JD)OV, para. 33 at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/50947/html.bookmark
25 Decision of the European Ombudsman in his inquiry into complaint 2393/2011/RA against the EP, paras. 50-63.
26 EO case 90/2009/(JD)OV, para. 33.
27 EO Case OI 10 2014 RA.
28 Case C658/11 European Parliament v. Council EU:C:2014:2025.
29 Case C658/11 European Parliament v. Council EU:C:2014:2025, para. 65.
30 Case C658/11 European Parliament v. Council EU:C:2014:2025, paras. 72, 85.
31 Case C658/11 European Parliament v. Council EU:C:2014:2025, para. 80.
32 Case C-263/14 European Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2016:435.
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ness, the picture becomes more complex. The Commis-
sion in particular has undergone a notable shift in its
stance. In the next section, we explain these preferences
by focusing on the impact transparency may have on the
institutional balance.
4. Alliances in Transparency?
This section offers a three-step analysis of the oversight
institutions based on their institutional preferences on
transparency as derived above. First, we will discuss pref-
erence alignment among the oversight institutions as
well as the executives. Second, we turn our attention to
what we classify as “unexpected alliances”, i.e. cases of
preference alignment between the executive institutions
and institutions of oversight. Finally, we provide broader
reflections on the contextual factors that help explain
these alliances, thereby presenting an insight into how
the EU’s transparency regime may develop in the future.
4.1. Oversight Alliances
EU oversight institutions differ on their preferences on
the three dimensions of transparency we have analysed:
public access, institutional access and degrees of open-
ness. In general, the EO, the Court and the EP are well
aligned as far as preferences on institutional access are
concerned. This applies both to the mandate as well as
the release of documents during the negotiating pro-
cess. Especially for the EP, institutional access is core
to its function of democratic scrutiny, a view supported
by the EO and CJEU. For example, in the consultations
for TTIP, the EO stated that the MEPs have a special
democratic responsibility to scrutinise the negotiations
on behalf of their constituents.33 Indeed, this is in line
with the Treaty of Lisbon, which has cemented the EP’s
role as (co)legislator in the EU’s constitutional structure,
and the interpretation of Art 218(10) further supports
this recognition.
When we shift our focus to public access to informa-
tion, two patterns emerge. First, all oversight institutions
support the public disclosure of the negotiatingmandate.
The case of Council v. In’t Veld helped to clarify the dis-
tinctions in the document between the constitutional el-
ements, which should be disclosed, and the substantive
parts of the document, where the negotiating position
may be revealed, and hence there is justification tomain-
tain some confidentiality. Moreover, the explicit request
to provide evidence that public access to the mandate
would jeopardise the negotiations further raises the bar-
rier to maintain secrecy. The EO’s own-initiative inquiry
with regard to the TTIP negotiating mandate builds upon
this case law. The EO further added to this argument
the democratic need for the Council to acknowledge the
relevance of transparency in international negotiations.
Second, all oversight institutions also accept—to varying
degrees—the reasoning that external negotiations war-
rant a certain degree of secrecy to ensure that the EU’s
bargaining position is not compromised. The exceptions
introduced by Regulation 1049/01 indicated clearly that
the legislators accepted the limitations to public access
to information in external negotiations. And as the Court
and the EO operate within the confines of the EU’s legal
order, they follow the transparency regime laid down by
the legislators.
Finally, with respect to the degree of transparency,
significant variations could be found. The EO, in particu-
lar in recent practices, has taken amore proactive stance
towards the publication of documents. This is not fol-
lowed by the EP, which has accepted a higher degree of
secrecy for negotiations, even showing concern for fu-
ture agreements of the EU as we saw above with the
ACTA documents and thereby potentially creating a polit-
ical space for confidentiality of negotiations in the EU. By
contrast, the CJEU bases its judgment on the disclosure
of documents by requiring the institutions to show an ac-
tual (as opposed to a hypothetical) risk from disclosure.
We expect to find the (quasi-)executive bodies op-
posing the oversight institutions, as they hold informa-
tion that may be disclosed to the interest of the public or
its representatives. Our findings suggest that the Coun-
cil and the Commission, do align preferences to a certain
extent, except when cases concern public access to the
mandate and the degree of openness to be pursued, as
will be explained in the following section.
4.2. Unexpected Allies in Transparency?
The alliance among oversight institutions, despite their
differences, may be to some extent expected. However,
it is less common to see views shared by oversight and ex-
ecutive institutions which often find each other on oppo-
site sides on transparency issues. Two such “unexpected”
alliances emerge from our analysis regarding public ac-
cess to documents. We consider these ‘unexpected’ as
explained in line with the institutional position and role
of the oversight institutions and executive actors. Gen-
erally, the literature suggests that oversight institutions
are in favour of transparency and access to information,
whereas due to their negotiating position in the interna-
tional negotiations arena the executive institutions rely
on arguments of trust and confidentiality.
In the first instance, the Commission alignedwith the
oversight institutions in favour of public disclosure of the
mandate. It is a Council document that to a certain ex-
tent dictates the Commission’s actions. As such, theman-
date’s release allows the Commission to deflect some of
the public criticism back to the Council. Moreover, re-
quests for the mandate’s release have often arisen when
the negotiations were already under way and when its
contemporary strategic value had been diminished. For
example, in the case of TTIP, the mandate had already
been leaked which made it clear that public disclosure
would not jeopardise the bargaining outcomes of the on-
33 Decision OI/10/2014/RA.
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going negotiations. Another factor that may explain this
unexpected alliance is the expectation that, due to a high
degree of politicisation, the risks associatedwith the pub-
lication of the mandate were lower than the risk of non-
disclosure. Accusations of secrecy and the public’smobili-
sation around it could jeopardise the entire negotiations.
A second instance where an unexpected alliance
emergedwas in the context of the public release of nego-
tiating documents. Similarly to the Commission and the
Council, the EP supported keeping documents secret in
the case of ACTA. The EP’s support becomes even more
evident in its response to the EO’s own-initiative inquiry
into the transparency of the triloguemeetings pertaining
to internal negotiations. The former President of the EP,
Martin Schultz, indicated the challenge to “find the right
balance between ensuring transparency to the public,
while at the same time ensuring that all political groups
can fully follow and influence the negotiations” (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2015a). It is here that one of the key
differences between the EP and the EO can be identified
in their role as guardians of transparency. The legislative
role of the EP puts it in an internal negotiating context
where it also faces a “limit position”, in contrast to the
EOwho remains largely outside of the legislative process.
Furthermore, an MEP can be held to account by an elec-
torate that is affected by their actions. This implies the
MEP may find themselves in a position where they wish
to be shielded from public scrutiny.
4.3. Institutional Politics of Transparency
Transparency is not merely an instrument of democratic
trust and participation. Indeed, in an institutionalised set-
ting it also becomes a tool of power dynamics in evolv-
ing constitutional structures. In our analysis three as-
pects of the politicised side of transparency emerge: the
consolidation of the EP’s legislative powers, the difficult
balance between the Council’s legislative and executive
roles, and the evolving interpretation of the exception
to public access to documents with regards to interna-
tional relations.
Throughout the EU’s history, the EP has always
pushed for greater powers, and institutional access to
information was an important pre-condition to perform
these legislative functions. With Lisbon, much has been
rectified and the powers granted to the EP represent
a significant change. Institutional access to information
featured both as an objective (cfr. SWIFT, ACTA or TTIP)
but also enabled the EP to gain a similar status to the
Council even in those areas where it has no legisla-
tive prerogatives, as shown in the Mauritius case. Yet,
with the empowerment of the EP we have also seen a
decline in its support for public access to documents.
For example, following its early rejection of the TFTP
agreement, the EP increasingly recognised that as co-
legislator, it shared the responsibility to consider mem-
ber states’ security concerns. The result was a softened
stance on data protection (Ripoll Servent & MacKen-
zie, 2011). Being exposed to the (external) negotiating
context generates a greater sense of responsibility for
or complicity in the agreed outcome and thus—much
like the Council or the Commission—the EP must assess
whether disclosure of the requested documents could
undermine the protected (public) interest (Abazi, 2016).
When the EP still found itself on the side-lines of EU
decision-making, it was easy to take more ambitious
positions on transparency (or policy-objectives) without
much ramifications. As a formal co-legislator, this has
clearly changed.
A second observation pertains to the increasing pres-
sures exerted on the Council to become more trans-
parent. Edgar Grande’s paradox of weakness explained
how member states’ delegation of powers to the EU
strengthened their autonomy vis-à-vis organised inter-
ests within their constituencies (Grande, 1996). The
multi-level decision-making context led by a bureaucratic
Commission provided an ideal scapegoat to advocate na-
tional policy reforms that were too difficult to sell pub-
licly at home. A key condition for this mechanism to
work was a certain degree of secrecy in Council decision-
making. In short, from its inception, the Council has used
secrecy both in domestic as well as international nego-
tiations to its own advantage. Therefore, it is evident
that this institution is more conservative when it comes
to transparency. This secrecy paradigm is currently pres-
sured frommultiple angles. Political pressures arise from
both the EP as well as the Commission, with each—for
their own reasons—trying to make the Council acknowl-
edge its legislative role and calling for a logic of (greater)
transparency (Hillebrand, 2017, in this issue).
In asserting its powers as co-legislator and demand-
ing institutional access to documents, the EP’s engage-
ment with the Council is often predicated by a desire to
be treated on equal footing. For example, the EP has in-
creasingly pushed for its own access to informationwhen
it concerns the release of the negotiating mandate, but
also calls on the Council to play a larger public role (Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2015b). Reluctance from the Council
to comply with such demands is not limited to the insur-
ance of autonomy from their constituents or the national
parliaments, but also the potential shift this can create in
the balance of power to their detriment. Similar to the
EP, the Commission is also concerned that the silence
and secrecy within the Council is becoming detrimental
to the European project. The EO also corroborated such
views in a recent interview:
What I’ve been trying to say to the Council, and to
EU institution leaders as well: If you want to break
through the myths, if you want to break through the
caricature, then you have to allow people to see how
laws are actually made, and how power is actually dis-
tributed…between the EU institutions and the mem-
ber states.34
34 EUObserver, Transparency complaints keep EU Ombudsman busy. 24 May 2017.
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A final reflection concerns the evolving interpretation of
what is considered an acceptable level of openness. Once
it has been shown that the public release of specific docu-
ments has not undermined negotiations, the bar is raised
as to the evidence required to keep a document secret.
The EO and CJEU recognise and uphold the exception to
public access to documents when it may jeopardise in-
ternational negotiations. With the EO defending an in-
terest that stands outside the internal (and external) ne-
gotiations and the Court mostly seeking to assert its ju-
risdiction, their interests do not collide. On the contrary,
the initiatives of the EO can lower the threshold for le-
gal contestation. The case on the disclosure of the Coun-
cil’s TTIP negotiating mandate may be a case in point, as
opposed to the release of the mandate in the TFTP that
came about as a result of a Court judgment. When docu-
ments are actually already public, such as through leaks,
both the EO and the Court maintain that there are no
firm grounds to defend nondisclosure of documents.
5. Conclusions: Towards a Steady State of Oversight
Interplays?
This paper questioned the general assumption in the lit-
erature that EU oversight institutions are in favour of
transparency in international negotiations and that tra-
ditionally EU executive institutions prefer some level of
secrecy in the international arena. In doing so, the paper
sought to analyse the positions of the EU oversight insti-
tutions towards transparency in a more holistic manner
and examine their interplays in delivering transparency.
Through this joint analysis, we identified whether par-
liamentary, judicial and administrative branches of over-
sight are allies in pursuing the objectives of transparency
but also when their positions diverge.
The role of each oversight institutions is of course
different in the EU context. It may even be questioned
why they should be analysed together. Indeed, the po-
sition of the Court as the legal authority to rule on is-
sues of transparency—and thereby create conditional-
ity of how transparency is practiced—may not be fully
comparable with the institutional preferences of the EP
that rather creates political dynamics on how far trans-
parency expands in international negotiations. But the
paper took these functional differences into account and
questioned institutional preferences in light of such insti-
tutional variations. One such difference is the position
between the Court and the EO. Namely, whereas the
Court’s position on transparency is evident and bound
in its role to interpret transparency rules, the EO has of-
ten moved beyond its statutory roles in interpreting the
scope for public transparency.
This paper showed that while there is general sup-
port fromoversight and executive institutions to the idea
that international negotiations warrant secrecy, varia-
tions across the institutions emerge for the degree of
openness. An alliance was found among the legislative,
administrative and judicial institutions as far as institu-
tional access to documents is concerned. Yet, the image
is less clear with regard to public access and the degree
of openness. Moreover, our analysis reveals that some
‘unexpected’ alliances have emerged particularly when
the negotiations were politicised.
The analysis provided in this paper contributes to-
wards an understanding of the dynamics among over-
sight institutions in the field of transparency. Linking this
knowledgewith the institutional preferenceswehave de-
rived, it becomes possible to provide some foresights on
how debates on transparency will develop in the future.
Foreseeable alliances most likely would feature the EO
and the CJEU furthering or changing the contours of con-
fidentiality in international negotiations. However, these
changes do not impact the steadily created core to insti-
tutional and public access. Numerous cases make it clear
that access to documents for the EP in international ne-
gotiations is mandatory throughout the process of nego-
tiations. It is only a question of changes in institutional
habits of the Council and the Commission to meet this
legal requirement. Yet public accessmay provemore con-
tentious as there is an increased public demand for trans-
parency but it ismetwith a solid preference by both over-
sight and executive institutions for confidentiality, espe-
cially during the negotiating process. Looking forward, it
seems more likely that “the degree of openness” will be-
come the main bone of contention in the EU’s interna-
tional negotiations.
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